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Digest: Munson v. Del Taco, Inc.
Joseph A. Chern
Opinion by Werdegar, J., expressing the unanimous view of
the court.
Issues
(1) Does a plaintiff seeking damages, under California Civil
Code section 52,1 claiming unequal treatment on the basis of
disability in violation of California Civil Code section 51 (“Unruh
Civil Rights Act”)2 and Americans with Disabilities Act of 19903
(“ADA”) need to prove intentional discrimination?
(2) If plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination, what
does “intentional discrimination” mean in this context?
Facts
Plaintiff Kenneth Munson has a physical disability that
requires the use of a wheelchair.4 He was a patron at a Del Taco
restaurant in San Bernardino, California, which was owned and
operated by defendant Del Taco, Inc.5 Plaintiff brought action in
state court, alleging that the restaurant discriminated against
him on the basis of his disability, because he encountered
architectural barriers6 that denied him access to the parking
area and restrooms.7 He sought injunctive relief, damages, and
attorney fees under California Civil Code section 52 (“section
52”).8 The action was removed to federal court.9
After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court
granted partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff.10 The

CAL. CIV. CODE § 52 (West 2007).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2007) (“Unruh Civil Rights Act”).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006).
Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 208 P.3d 623, 625 (Cal. 2009).
Id.
Plaintiff’s primary complaint was that the doorway of the restaurant bathroom
was too narrow for a wheelchair and the restroom itself was not adequately designed for a
wheelchair user. Id. at n.3. Following the complaint, defendant remodeled the restaurant
to correct these and other problems. Id.
7 Id. at 625.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 623.
10 Id. at 625.
1
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district court concluded there was no genuine issue of fact that
an architectural barrier existed and that the restroom doorway
widening was readily achievable.11 Therefore, an ADA violation
occurred and plaintiff was entitled to pursue statutory
damages.12
In lieu of holding a jury trial on the issue of damages, the
parties stipulated to $12,000 in damages.13 Defendant appealed
the district court’s decision granting plaintiff’s motion for partial
summary judgment.14
The California Supreme Court previously held that proof of
intentional discrimination was necessary to obtain damages
under section 52, despite legislative additions to include
unintentional ADA violations under the Unruh Civil Rights
Act.15 On appeal, defendant argued that plaintiff failed to
introduce sufficient evidence to establish the requisite intent
under the Unruh Civil Rights Act.16 Plaintiff defends that such
intent is not required or, alternatively, that the requisite intent
is the intent not to remove barriers to access where readily
achievable.17 The Court of Appeals certified this issue to the
Supreme Court of California.18
Analysis
1. Statutory Background
California Civil Code section 51 provides substantive
protection against invidious discrimination in public
accommodations and section 52 specifies the remedies for
Prior to 1992, the interrelated
violations of section 51.19
statutory scheme of section 51 and 52 required proof of
intentional discrimination in public accommodations in violation
of the terms of that statute.20 Subsequently, in order to conform
aspects of California law to the recently enacted ADA, the
Legislature amended section 51 (“the 1992 Amendment”) to
incorporate violations under the ADA as violations of section

Id.
Id.
Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. (citing Gunther v. Lin, 144 Cal.App.4th 223 (Cal. 2006)).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 626.
18 Id. at 624.
19 Id. at 626 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51,52 (West 2007)).
20 Id. at 626–27 (discussing the holding of Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV,
52 Cal.3d 1142 (Cal. 1991)).
11
12
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51.21
The incorporated ADA provisions include access
requirements to facilities, which do not require a showing of
intentional discrimination if removal of architectural barriers is
readily achievable.22
2. Statutory Language and Context
In light of the statutory history of sections 51 and 52, the
court noted that a reasonable interpretation of those sections
authorize a private action for damages of ADA violations without
proof of intentional discrimination.23 However, despite the 1992
Amendment, section 52 does not expressly state that its remedies
apply to every violation of section 51, but only to any person who
“denies, aids or incites a denial, or makes any discrimination or
Therefore, another
distinction contrary to Section 51.”24
linguistically possible interpretation is that section 52 authorizes
a private action for damages only for ADA violations involving
intentional discrimination.25
But this latter interpretation is without historical support.26
Section 52 has always provided the enforcement mechanism for
The Court has only held that
violations of section 51.27
unintentional violations did not violate section 52 at all, prior to
the1992 Amendment.28 Therefore, it must follow the effect of the
amendment is to create an exception for the need to show
intentional discrimination for remediable violations under
section 52.29
3. Legislative History
The legislative history of the 1992 Amendment indicates the
legislative intent was to “provid[e] persons injured by a violation
of the ADA with the remedies provided by the Unruh Act (e.g.,
right of private action for damages).”30 Although the legislative
history does not distinguish between intentional and
unintentional discrimination, any doubt must be resolved by the
principle that the Unruh Act “must be construed liberally in
order to. . . create and preserve a nondiscriminatory environment
Id. at 627 (codifying this amendment in CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(f) (West 2007)).
Id. at 628.
Id. at 628–29 (referencing the interpretation embraced by the court in Lentini v.
California Center for the Arts, 370 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2004)).
24 Id. at 629.
25 Id. (citing Gunther v. Lin, 144 Cal.App.4th 223, 234–35 (Cal. 2006)).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. (citing Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1175 (Cal.
1991)).
29 Id. at 630.
30 Id. (quoting Assem. B., No. 1077, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1991–92)).
21
22
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in California business establishments.”31
Accordingly, the
evidence suggests the 1992 Amendment not only prohibits ADA
violations under the Unruh Act, but also provides remedial
damages for any such violation under section 52.32
4. Relationship to Other Statutes and Prevention of Abusive
Litigation
The court rejects the argument that there was a deliberate
legislative choice to require proof of intentional discrimination
under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, which provided minimum
damages of $4,000.33 Although unintentional violations could be
remedied under the Disabled Persons Act,34 which provided
minimum damages of only $1,000, the 1992 Amendments were
not only made to the Unruh Civil Rights Act, but also to the
Disabled Persons Act.35 Consequently, the minimum damages
under the two laws were identical at $250 and the possible
difference in minimum damages for greater scienter was
eliminated by the 1992 Amendment.36
Similarly, the Legislature acknowledges that the Unruh
Civil Rights Act and the Disabled Persons Act have significant
areas of overlapping application and expressly prohibits double
recover.37 Nevertheless, there are unique provisions to both
statutory schemes, which do not render either section redundant
and eliminates the need to restrict any the remediable
violations.38
Finally, the court gives ultimate deference to the Legislature
to consider whether there may be a need for statutory alterations
to prevent “abusive private legal actions and settlement
Courts are bound to interpret the statutes in
tactics.”39
accordance with legislative intent, free from substituting its own
policy judgments.40
Holding
The court held that a plaintiff seeking damages under
California Civil Code section 52, who claims the denial of full and
equal treatment on the basis of disability in violation of the
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Id. (quoting Angelucci v. Century Supper Club, 41 Cal.4th 160, 167 (Cal. 2007)).
Id.
Id. at 631.
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 54–55.3 (West 2007) (Disabled Persons Act).
Munson, 208 P.3d at 631.
Id.
Id. at 632.
Id.
Id. at 633.
Id.
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Unruh Civil Rights Act and the ADA, need not prove “intentional
discrimination.”41
Legal Significance
Declining to impose a non-statutory requirement for a
plaintiff to prove intentional discrimination when seeking
damages for ADA violations under the Unruh Act, the court
expressly overrules Gunther v. Lin.42 As a result, millions of
disabled Californians who rely on the Unruh Act for protection
from discriminatory business practices are afforded broader
protection by eliminating overly burdensome proof requirements
to recover remedial damages under the state antidiscrimination
law.

41
42

Id. at 634.
Id.
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